Quantum probability and conceptual combination in conjunctions

I consider the general problem of category conjunctions in the light of Pothos & Busemeyer (P&B)'s quantum probability (QP) account of the conjunction fallacy. I argue that their account as presented cannot capture the "guppy effect" - the case in which a class is a better member of a conjunction A^B than it is of either A or B alone

Concept talk cannot be avoided

Distinct systems for representing concepts as prototypes, exemplars, and theories are closely integrated in the mind, and the notion of concept is required as a framework for exploring this integration. Eliminating the term “concept” from our theories will hinder rather than promote scientific progress

The modifier effect and property mutability

The modifier effect is the reduction in perceived likelihood of a generic property sentence, when the head noun is modified. We investigated the prediction that the modifier effect would be stronger for mutable than for central properties, without finding evidence for this predicted interaction over the course of five experiments. However Experiment 6, which provided a brief context for the modified concepts to lend them greater credibility, did reveal the predicted interaction. It is argued that the modifier effect arises primarily from a general lack of confidence in generic statements about the typical properties of unfamiliar concepts. Neither prototype nor classical models of concept combination receive support from the phenomenon

The inverse conjunction fallacy

If people believe that some property is true of all members of a class such as sofas, then they should also believe that the same property is true of all members of a conjunctively defined subset of that class such as uncomfortable handmade sofas. A series of experiments demonstrated a failure to observe this constraint, leading to what is termed the inverse conjunction fallacy. Not only did people often express a belief in the more general statement but not in the more specific, but also when they accepted both beliefs, they were inclined to give greater confidence to the more general. It is argued that this effect underlies a number of other demonstrations of fallacious reasoning, particularly in category-based induction. Alternative accounts of the phenomenon are evaluated, and it is concluded that the effect is best interpreted in terms of intensional reasoning [Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293–315.]

IS 502 Vocation of Ministry

Required Texts Foster, R. (1978) Celebration of Discipline. San Francisco: Harper Collins. Foster, R. (1983) Study Guide for Celebration of Discipline. San Francisco: Harper Collins. Smith, G. (1999). Courage and Calling: Embracing Your God-Given Potential, Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. Stevens, P. (1999). The Other Six Days: Vocation, Work and Ministry. Rediger, L. (2003). Beyond the Scandals: A Guide to Healthy Sexuality for Clergy. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press. Woodley, R. (2001). Living in Color: Embracing God’s Passion for Diversity. Grand Rapids, MI: Chosen Books. Choose one of the following: Clouse, B. and R. (1989). Women in Ministry: Four Views. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. Groothuis, R.M. (1997). Good News for Women: A Biblical Picture of Gender Equality, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker.https://place.asburyseminary.edu/syllabi/1901/thumbnail.jp

Compositionality and Concepts in Linguistics and Psychology

cognitive science; semantics; languag

The inherence heuristic is inherent in humans

[Open Peer Commentary] The inherence heuristic is too broad as a theoretical notion. The authors are at risk of applying their own heuristic in supporting itself. Nonetheless the article provides useful insight into the ways in which people overestimate the coherence and completeness of their understanding of the world

Explanations of comparative facts

A comparative fact can be presented in two ways. ‘Among white evangelical Christians, Obama had 40% fewer votes than McCain.’ or ‘Among white evangelical Christians, McCain had 40% more votes than Obama.’ Focusing on why Obama had fewer votes than McCain may result in a different explanation from focusing on why McCain had more votes than Obama, although it is the same fact. Thus what determines whether we focus in our explanation on Obama or McCain? In two studies, we show that people generally focused more on the first part of the comparative fact. However, when the comparative fact is presented in a negative frame (‘less … than’) there was a shift in focus from the first to the second part of the fact. For neutral items this moderating effect did not occur. The Principle of Lexical Marking (Clark, 1969) and Loss Aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) are discussed as possible accounts for this shift in focus

Semantic memory redux: an experimental test of hierarchical category representation

Four experiments investigated the classic issue in semantic memory of whether people organize categorical information in hierarchies and use inference to retrieve information from them, as proposed by Collins & Quillian (1969). Past evidence has focused on RT to confirm sentences such as “All birds are animals” or “Canaries breathe.” However, confounding variables such as familiarity and associations between the terms have led to contradictory results. Our experiments avoided such problems by teaching subjects novel materials. Experiment 1 tested an implicit hierarchical structure in the features of a set of studied objects (e.g., all brown objects were large). Experiment 2 taught subjects nested categories of artificial bugs. In Experiment 3, subjects learned a tree structure of novel category hierarchies. In all three, the results differed from the predictions of the hierarchical inference model. In Experiment 4, subjects learned a hierarchy by means of paired associates of novel category names. Here we finally found the RT signature of hierarchical inference. We conclude that it is possible to store information in a hierarchy and retrieve it via inference, but it is difficult and avoided whenever possible. The results are more consistent with feature comparison models than hierarchical models of semantic memory